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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRILBA A. JONES, by her Guardian ad
Liten, BONNIE JEWELL SHINER,
Plaintiff

and Respondent,

vs.

Case

No. 18339

SHARON COLBY KIEFER,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff

brought this action against defendant to set

aside two deeds to real property located in Nephi, Juab County,
Utah.

(R. 1)
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Court, Honorable J. Robert

Bullock, sitting without a jury, resulting in a judgment for
Plaintiff setting aside the two deeds.

(R. 22,23)

Objections to

the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and a
Motion for a new trial were made by Defendant.

(R. 24, 25; 27-34)

An order was entered denying relief as to all matters raised.
(R.

38)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the judgment entered by the Court below be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's first marriage to Sharon Atkin produced nine
children, six of whom survived to March 3, 1978, to wit: Millie
Colby, Bonnie Shiner, Mignon Payne, Warren Atkin, Rawlen Atkin,
and Derrall Atkin. (T. 35, Ln. 9-16)

Sharon Atkin died in 1944

and plaintiff married Grant Jones in 1950. (T. 35, Ln. 23, 24)
No children were born of this marriage (T. 35, Ln. 27) and on
July 26, 1965 plaintiff executed a will leaving her estate to
her husband and in the event he should predecease her to the
above-mentioned six children. (Exhibit 7)
Grant Jones and plaintiff purchased the home and real property that is the subject of this action in June of 1970 (Exhibit
2, Page 56) after Mr. Jones retired from the Board of Education

in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(T. 36, Ln. 2-6)

Plaintiff and Mr. Jones

resided alone in the said home located at 409 South First East,
Nephi, Utah until his death on December 26, 1976. (T. 36, Ln. 9-27)
After his funeral, it was agreed by the family that Corrine, Grant's
niece, would take care of paying the bills for the funeral and take
over the management and supervision of plaintiff's financial affairs.
(T. 37, Ln. 21-30; 38, Ln. 1-7)

Approximately one week after the funeral, Corrine had done
nothing to help plaintiff and from early January, 1977 until February, 1978 plaintiff's guardian ad litem, Bonnie Jewel Shiner,
one of plaintiff's children, helped her with her finances as follows:
obtained Grant's life insurance policy from the safety deposit box
at First Security Bank in Nephi; paid the expenses of the funeral;
converted $10,000 in regular savings to certificates of deposit;
had herself established as a co-tenant, at the request of plaintiff,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-2administered by the Utah State Library.
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on plaintiff's checking and savings accounts, and her safety
deposit box, all located at First Security Bank in Nephi; reinvested and maintained the $10,000 funds for highest interest
yield; visited plaintiff frequently and reconciled her checking
account as she was unable to do so; and was generally supportive
of plaintiff during this period of time.

(T. 11, Ln. 4-30; 12,

Ln. 1-4; 38, Ln. 8-JO; 39, Ln. 1-30; 40, Ln. 1-30; 41, Ln. 1-30;

42, Ln. 1-26; 56, Ln. 17-30; 57, Ln. 1-13; Exhibit 6)
Plaintiff lived by herself in the subject home from the
date of Grant's death until January 31, 1978 when she fell and
broke her right femur while babysitting.
Ln. 27-30; Exhibit 1)

(T. 12, Ln. 5-30; 42,

Plaintiff was hospitalized at the Payson

Hospital on that night and the fracture was treated by insertion
of a traction pin and the institution of traction.

This resulted

in a staphylococcal infection necessitating Buck's traction
instead of skeletal traction and the administration of substantial
drug therapy to eliminate the infection which still obtained at
discharge.

(Exhibit 1, Discharge Summary, dated February 22, 1978)

Plaintiff was not actually discharged from the hospital until
March 27, 1978.

(T. 5, Ln. 16, 17)

On February 23, 1978, Millie Colby, one of plaintiff's
children, had plaintiff execute a power of attorney nominating
Millie as attorney-in-fact for plaintiff to act in her behalf
(Exhibit 9) directing that "my belongings and any monies derived
therefrom" be used to pay her just debts and the remainder should
be paid to her six children and that a proper will should be made
encompassing these desires.
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On March 3, 1978, plaintiff's condition in Payson Hospital
was as follows: she was 73 years of age and in pain, confused and
disoriented as to time and place; was under heavy medication for
pain; suffered from bedsores and constipation; had a staph infection caused by the traction pin; was under heavy medication to
eliminate the infection; was catheterized and had ·infection caused
thereby and was in isolation due to the staph infection.

(Exhibit

1)
On March 3, 1978, Millie Colby had plaintiff execute a
warranty deed transfering her fee simple interest in to her home
tn Nephi to Millie. {Exhibit ·3; T. 15,, Lri. 15-30; 16, Ln. 1-8; 75,
Ln. 1-8)

Millie Colby also had a codicil

to plaintiff's will,

Exhibit 7, drawn up and executed by plaintiff at or about this
time.

(T. 46, Ln.

3-~)

On March 17, 1978, Millie Colby had an

affidavit prepared and executed by plaintiff.

(Exhibit 10; T. 81,

Ln. 19-22)
While plaintiff was in .the .. hospital Millie Colby closed
the checking and savings accounts in the names of plaintiff and
Bonnie and set up the checking account in plaintiff's name only
and the savings account in plaintiff's ·and Millie's name jointly.
(T. 45, Ln. 23-30; 57, Ln. 1-30; 58, Ln. 1-30)
Plaintiff was discharged from the Payson Hospital on
March 27, 1978, and moved back into her home in Nephi.
Ln. 19-21)

(T. 53,

When plaintiff discovered that Millie had had the

bank accounts changed, she had the accounts changed back into
her name and Bonnie's name jointly.
57, Ln. 1-30; 5-8, Ln. 1-30)

(T. 46, Ln. 30; 47, Ln. 1-6;

Plaintiff paid the 1978 real estate

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

taxes on her home.

(Exhibit 5)

Plaintiff continued to live in her home in Nephi until
August of 1979 (T. 53, Ln. 19-21) when her health would no
(T. 22, Ln. 25-30; 23, Ln. 1-6)

longer permit her to live alone.

On September 1, 1979 she moved into the Golden Living Center in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

(T. 23, Ln. 20, 21)

In the latter part of September, 1979, Bonnie was going
to list plaintiff's house for sale when it was discovered for
(T. 18, Ln.

the first time that the house was in Millie's name.

18-25; 16, Ln. 14-19)

Plaintiff originally commenced legal

action against Millie Colby on October 2, 1979 but the .matter
was never brought on for trial.

(Exhibit 2, Page 61)

An action was brought in Salt Lake County to establish a
Conservator.ship for plaintiff with Bonnie as Conservator; and
then First Security Bank was substituted as Conservator; and
finally everyone, Bonnie, Millie, Derrall, Mignon, Millie's
attorney, agreed to Walker Bank as the Conservator.

8-15; 52, Ln. 15-21)

(T. 51, Ln.

There was never any dispute as to the neces-

sity for the Conservatorship for plaintiff and Walker Bank refused
to take the Conservatorship because there was not enough money
involved.

(T. 72, Ln. 29,30)

Millie Colby died April 6, 1981 and it was shortly after
this that plaintiff discovered the subject home in Nephi had
been transferred to defendant, who is the daughter of Millie Colby
and the granddaughter of plaintiff, by warranty deed.
14; 66, Ln. 10-16; Exhibit 2, Page 64)

Plaintiff then commenced

this action against defendant Sharon Colby Kiefer.
-5-

(T. 71, Ln.

(R. 1)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT SETTING ASIDE THE DEEDS FROM
PLAINTIFF TO MILLIE AND FROM MILLIE TO DEFENDANT IS SUPPORTED
BY THE REQUISITE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED EY THIS COURT.
An action to set aside deeds is in equity and " . . . this
Court has the prerogative of reviewing the facts as well as the
law. However, we must take into account the advantaged position
of the trial judge and will only reverse where the evidence
clearly preponderated against his decision." Peterson v. Carter,
Utah,579 P. 2d 329 (1978)
A.

Burden of Proof

The case of Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,
122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 692

(195~)

held that a presumption of

genuineness, due execution and delivery of a deed arises from
acknowledgement and recordation of a deed and should be given
great weight and it should not be overthrown by a mere preponderance of the evidence: but, this rebuttable presumption may be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court below was aware of this burden and made a specific finding that all of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint had been proved by clear and convincing evidence.

(R. 21)

It is undisputed that undue influence, duress, fraud and
the like must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P. 2d 420 (1959); but it is
submitted that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to
establish the incompetency or lack of mental capacity of a granter.
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is a split of authority on t~e quantum of proof necessary.
CJS, Deeds, §208(b) ., p 99 states the following:
Ordinarily, the incapacity of the granter at the
time of execution of a deed must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, or, as is held in
some jurisdictions, clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, . . . .
The:case of Peterson v. Carter, Utah, 579 P. 2d 329 (1978)
held as follows in regard to the quantum of proof necessary for
showing incompetency as compared to undue influence at 579 P. 2d
331:
. . . the burden of showing undue influence in the
execution of the deed is even greater than that of
showing incompetence.
It must be established by
clear and'convincing evidence that the grantee
exercised a dominating influence over the granter.
In the case of Blankenship v. Christensen, Utah, 622
806 (1981)

P. 2d

this Court also appears to have adopted the prepon-

derance of evidence standard to establish the incompetency of a
granter.

This Court held at 622 p; 2d 808:

Even though it may plausibly be contended that the
evidence would support a contrary finding, we are
not persuaded that there is no reasonable basis in
the evidence to support the trial court's finding
that at the time he made the assignment to his wife,
Dee E. Christensen lacked mental capacity and that
the assignment was thus invalid and passed no interest in the property to her.
This could not be by clear and convincing evidence as this standard requires the evide.nce to be such that there is no serious
or substantial doubt as to the conclusion. Northcrest, Inc. v.
Walker Bank & Trust Co., supra.
It is submitted that plaintiff has proved her case by
clear and convincing evidence wherever

necessary and at.the

very least has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
-7-
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her lack of capacity to make the deed, (Exhibit 3), on March 3,
1978.
B.

The Mental Capacity of plaintiff on March 3, 1978.

This Court has announced the following test in determining the mental capacity or competency of a granter in making a
deed, In the case of Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.
2d 142 (1945):
Were mental facuities so deficient or impaired
that there was not sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the deed, its nature and
its probable consequences, and to act with discretion in relation thereto, or with relation
to ordinary affairs of life?
The Court below answered the foregoing inquiry in the
affirnative and made the following findings of fact with reference
to plaintiff's mental capacity on March 3, 1978:
3.
On January 30, 1978 the Incompetent, age 73,
broke her right femur and was confined as a bed
patient in the Payson Hospital, Payson, Utah from
that date until March 27, 1978. For a substantial
part of this time, the Incompetent was in pain,
confused and disoriented as to time and place: was
under heavy medication for pain: suffered from bed
sores, constipation, staph infection of the right
leg, catheterization and infection caused thereby
and was k~pt~in isolation because of the infection.
(R. 19, 20)

This finding is supported by the testimony of Bonnie Shiner
as follows:
Q
And when you were going in, you had made the
statement previously that in your conversation with
Millie that you didn't think that her mental condition was "too good:" now what, who made that statement, or did you?
A

We both agreed to that.

We both talked about it.

Q
Then what was the basis, on what did you base
that statement?
A
The way she talked.
She talked out of her head
every time that I visited her.
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Q

Now wait, what's talking "out of her head"?

A
Sometimes she didn't know where she was. She
talked about her husband, who was no longer living,
kept crying for him.
She didn't know why she was
in the hospital or what hospital.
(T. 44, Ln. 16-29)
The nurse's notes in Exhibit 1 state as follows:
2-6-78, 1100, patient seems disoriented, pain in
left leg; 2-b-78, 1300, patient is still disoriented and confused; 2-6-78, 2200, patient confused;
2-"f-78, 0400, patient disoriented, she states she
doesn't know where she is; 2-9-78, 1610, patient
confused at present time, family at bedside; 2-9-78,
1750, patient confused, looks very tired at present;
2-9-78, 2000, patient very disoriented and confused;
2-10-·18, 2400, talking to people who aren't here,
and as if she was home, keeps trying to get out of
bed, put restraints on; 2-11-78; 1630, patient in
pain, a little disoriented; 2-12-78, 2140, gave
patient medication for sleep - disoriented; 2-14-78,
U230, awake, appears confused; 2-14-78, 2400, momentarily confused ; 2-15-78, 1200, confused about
time and date; 2-16-78, 2045, patient crying, stated
husband passed away year ago; 2-19-78, patient moved
to isolation; 2-20-78, 1110, crying, asking for
elders; 2-21-78, 0630, patient appears to be disoriented this a.m.; 2-21-78, 0815, crying and pain
in leg; 2-21-78, 1000, appears confused, crying and
asking for deceased husband; 2-21-78, 2140, patient
was crying, appears confused and calling out for
Grant; 2-23-78, 0400, awake, seems confused; 2-25-78,
0700, patient seems confused and disoriented; 2-25-78,
1330, appears to be confused still; 2-26-78, 0550,
crying and pain in right leg; 2-27-78, 1230, patient
depressed; 2-28-78, 1019, patient confused, calls
for Milly (sic); 3-1-78, 0800, patient awake, confused; J-1-78, 2400, patient awake and very disoriented; 3-2-78, 1335, pain in right leg; 3-3-78, 0540,
patient awake and crying. R.N. gave medication for
pain; 3-3-78, 1400, visiting with family; 3-3-78,
1930, complaints of being depressed, crying at present, reported to R.N.; 3-7-78, 2000, patient, just
nervous; 3-8-78, 0800, patient confused as to place;
3-9-78, 1015, patient has very negative attitude,
seems depressed; 3-12-78, 0400, appears confused at
times; 3-17-78, 2130, patient a little dispondent at
present; 3-18-78, 0400, patient seems a bit disoriented; 3-18-78, 0600, patient is a bit disoriented,
thinks she is home; 3-21-78, 0715, on telephone,
appears to be a little confused; 3-22-78, 0200,
confused and disoriented; 3-22-78, 2105, patient
0
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appears to be confused; 3-23-78, 0800, patient
asks, "Why am I in the hospital." seems a little
confused; 3-23-78, 1845, appears disoriented,
3-24-78, 0245, patient is confused; 3-24-78,
0310, patient gets upset and confused; 3-25-78,
2100, seems somewhat confused; 3-26-78, 1845,
patient seems to have a very negative attitude
and seems depressed; 3-27-78, 0950, discharged
to home . . . fairly cheerful but somewhat confused. (Exhibit 1)
Plaintiff's orientation in the hospital can be seen from
the following:
Q
Do you remember, do you know how long you
were in the hospital?

A

It seemed like about two or three weeks.

Q

Two or three weeks?

A

Yes.

* * *
Q
Would you think it might be closer to two
months?

A

Oh, no, I wasn't there that long.

Q
Okay.
(T. 13, Ln. lU-14; Ln. 17-19)

Concerning the execution of the deed:
A
Millie says, "Momma, sign this paper," And I
said, "What is it?" She said, "It's just a paper."
Well, how'd I know what I was signing.
Q
Well, did you just go ahead and sign it based
on that information?

A

I signed it, yes.

Q

You didn't know this was a deed to your house?

A

No, I didn't know nothing.

Q
Did you ever -- well, when did you first find
out about this deed that you had signed?
A
I don't know.
Somebody brought it to me afterwards.
I didn't no more know what I was doing than
nothing.
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q
(By Mr. Anderson) Do you remember at the time
that Millie, that you signed the deed, do you remember signing the deed?

A
(T.

She told me it was just a paper.
28-30; 28, Ln. 1)

27, Ln.

Discovering that she no longer owned the property:
Well, after you got out of the hospital, how
long was it until you discovered that you didn't
own your house any longer?

Q

A
Well, I was going to sell it, and I decided
that it wasn't, I couldn't sell it. They told me
I couldn't sell it, it wasn't mine. And that is
unbelievable. You know better than that, Wendell.
(T. 16, Ln. 13-19)
Her primary treating physician:

Q

And your doctor's name was Dr. Mendenhall?

A

Dr. McDonald.

* * *
Q
Do you remember seeing Dr. Mendenhall for your
leg or anything?
A
(T.

I don't know.
19, Ln. 3-4; Ln. 7-9)

About the notary public:

Q
Okay. You don't remember Mr. Harmer notarizing
your signature, in other words, saying yes? You
don't remember him talking to you and saying, Millie,
do you know what this is -- I mean, "Trilba, do you
know what this is?"
A

No.

Q

You don't recall that?

A
She just had come over and asked me if I'd sign
the paper, and so I did.
(T.

28, Ln. 4-11)

Instructions to Millie:
Did you go ahead and tell her to have a deed
prepared so you could give her your house?

Q

A

No, I don't remember nothing like that. I don't
doing that at all.
::
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Defendant contends that plaintiff's execution of Exhibit 3
represented a gift of plaintiff's home in Nephi to Mi_llie.-- (T. 91,
Ln. 6-23).

Defendant further testified that Millie told her about

the gift at the time of the hospitalization, at the time the deed
was signed in

1~78.

(T. 93, Ln. 15-26)

The Court below further found:
The Court finds that on March 3, 1978 the Incompetent
did not have the requisite mental capacity to make a
valid gift of her home and real property and even if
she did have the mental capacity to execute the deed
she did not ~now she was making a gift. The Incompetent did not have the intent to convey the property
to Millie Colby as her sole and separate property nor
did she intend to make a gift of the property to Millie
Colby to the exclusion of her rights and the rights of
the other heirs.
(R. 20)

At the time of the alleged gift to Millie, plaintiff was a
widow, 73 years of age, with no employment and whose assets consisted of her home in Nephi; $10,000 in savings; a car and miscellaneous furniture; a social security check monthly in the sum of
$478.00; and a monthly VA check in the sum of $75.00.
29; 64, Ln. 13; 55, Ln. 14-30; 56, Ln. 1-6)

(T. 23, Ln.

Bonnie Shiner testi-

fied at the time of the trial that there was only $7,900.00 left
out of the savings.

(T. 60, Ln. 5)

Plaintiff had been residing at

the Golden Living Center in Salt Lake City, Utah, since September
1, 1979, at a basic cost of $650.00 per month.

(T. 25, Ln. 9)

Also, at the time of the alleged gift, plaintiff had five
other children who she had remembered in her will,

E~hibit

7, and

in the Fower of Attorney, Exhibit 9, executed just eight days prior
to the execution of Exhibit 3.
The evidence in support of the above findings of fact is
overwhelming.
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C.

Duress and Undue Influence.

The Court below made a finding of fact as follows:
The Court further finds that Millie Colby exercised duress on the Incompetent in procuring the
deed from the Incompetent to herself dated and
recorded March 3, 1981 involving the home and
real property hereinabove referred to. (R. 20)
Duress is defined as follows in·CJS, Deeds, §61, p. 727:
Duress invalidating a deed may be defined as a
condition of mind produced by improper external
pressure destroying the free agency of the granter and inducing him to execute a conveyance not
of his own volition.
CJS, Deeds, §61, ·further explains the sufficiency of conduct
necessary to produce duress at p. 757 as follows:
Under the modern doctrine there is no exact legal
standard with respect to the sufficiency of facts
to produce duress.
Accordingly, whether or not a
deed will be set aside on the ground that it was
procured through duress depends on the circumstances of the particular case, such as age, mental
capacity, and relation of the parties, and pecuniary
necessity and distress.
All of the argument with reference to plaintiff's mental
capacity in the preceding argument is incorporated herein by
reference.

Plaintiff was of limited financial resources and

testified as follows:
Do you remember Millie coming in and then
she was saying that Bonnie was going to steal
all of your money?

Q

A

Yes.

Q
And that Bonnie was going to steal your house,
too?
A

Yes.

Yes.

Q
And that was about the First of March, and
Bonnie was going to steal everything you had?
A

That's right.
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Q
That's right, you remember that.
And then
Bonnie told you -- or Millie told you that you'd
better change the bank accounts into her name,
isn't that right?
A
Right, that's what Millie says.
(T. 30, Ln. 4-16)
This testimony is corroborated by defendant's own testimony given to discredit Bonnie Shiner:
A

My grandmother is scared of Bonnie Shiner.

Q

Do you know why?

A
She talks her into doing anything that she
wants her to do.

* * *
A
Yes, while my mother, well, my grandmother,
Trilba, was staying in Payson Hospital, she had
my mother take her purse home over to her house
in Spanish Fork· and keep it because she knew that
Bonnie was coming down that weekend to the hospital
to see her and she didn't want to have anything
stolen out of it.

* * *
Q
Was there anyone in particular she was afraid
of that would have access to her checking account?
A
Bonnie.
(T. 90, Ln. 1-4; Ln. 7-12; Ln. 23-25)
And further by the testimony of Bonnie Shiner:
A
.And my sister asked me what I
with her money.

Q

What was your response?

A

I

Q

And what did she say then?

had done

told her I moved it to Salt Lake City.

A
Well, she said I stole it, I never should have
done that, and I stole her money, I stole everything
she had.
(T. 43, Ln. 21-27)
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As noted in the definition of duress, supra, it is not
necessary to have the "bare knuckled" variety; it

is sufficient

if "improper external pre~sure" destroys the free will of the
granter.

It is submitted that the threats of what Bonnie was

going to do with her "belongings" was sufficient pressure on
plaintiff in her physical and mental condition as to overcome
her free will; and particularly. if she felt that Millie was
going to hold the property for her.
Defendant's attorney's cross-examination of Bonnie attempted to discredit her to no avail and plaintff 's own evaluation of
Bonnie is as follows:
Q

Does Bonnie ever steal anything from you?

A
No.
She's the one that pays my bills.
in her life.
_

Never

....

* * *
Did you ever have any arrangement with
reference to your bank accounts with Bonnie?

Q

A
Well, Bonnie paid my bills, and she sees
that I have enough money to get, to pay my rent
and get along on.

* * *
Q
In fact you counted on Millie on a lot of
things?
A

You bet I did.

Q

Okay.

A

You are not kidding.

Q

They are good daughters, aren't they?

So she helped you out a lot?.
So's Bonnie.

A
Both of them.
I don't know what I'd have
done without either one of them.

Q
Did you ever give Millie your purse and
say, "Please take it home so someone won't get
into it"?
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A
No, I don't.
(T. 30, Ln. 28-30; 11, Ln. 26-29; 28, Ln. 19-28)
Millie's threats to plaintiff concerning Bonnie were not
made in the presence of Mr. Harmer or Mrs. Luke.

Neither ot

these parties, based on education and experience, and based on
a specific interrogation of plaintiff regarding probable consequences of the deed, could render opinions bearing overwhelming
probative value and the Court below appropriately disregarded
these opinions or gave them little, if any, weight in making
its decision.
Immediately following the above quoted finding of fact,
the following additional finding of fact appears:
Persons w~o stood in a fiduciary capacity to
the Incompetent and who had a duty to tell her
of the deed failed to do so.
Plaintiff agrees with the statement appearing in appellant's
brief at page 16, "The only 'person' to whom the finding could
refer is Millie Colby."
The case of Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d
420 (1959) refers to and treats duress and undue influence as
one and the same where a confidential relationship exists. The
Johnson case, supra, was urged on the Court below as the law of
the case and the result reached by the said Court is consistent
with the Johnson case on facts that are strikingiy similar.
The finding with reference to the fiduciary duty of Millie
Colby is tantamount to a finding that a confidential relationship
existed and there is ample evidence in support of the same in
addition to the mother-daughter relationship: Millie had plaintiff
give her a power of attorney on February 23, 1978; had all of
the bank
byfor digitization
deleting
Bonnie
a and
co-tenant
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or about March 1, 1978; took the warranty deed in question to
plaintiff's home on March 3, 1978; took an affidavit from plaintiff on March 17, 1978; and had a will or codicil

prepared and

executed by plaintiff du~ing plaintiff's hospitalization.
Once again, the testimony of plaintiff is helpful on the
issue of the confidential relationship:
In fact you counted on Millie on a lot of
things?

Q

A

You bet I did.

Q

Okay.

A

You are not kidding.

Q

They are good daughters, aren't they?

So she helped you out a lot?
So's Bonnie.

A
Both of them. I don't know what
done without either of them.
(T.

I~d

have

28, Ln. 19-25)

Defendant also knew the relationship between her mother
Millie and plaintiff:
Okay. To your own knowledge, what was the
relationship between your mother and your grandmother, Trilba?
Q

A
They had a very good mother-daughter relationship.
Q

Okay.

A
My mother did a lot of things for my grandmother. She always thought a lot of her.
Okay. And in fact do you have personal
knowledge that while your mother was in the hospital and prior to that time that -- or, excuse me,
-- your grandmother was in the hospital that your
mother actually handled some financial affairs for
your grandmother?
Q

A

Yes, I.do.

Q
Do you have personal knowledge as to whether
or not your mother's name was on some of your grandmother's accounts?
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A
Yes, I do.
(T. 88, Ln. 22-30; 89, Ln. 1-8)
The test of the existence of a confidential relationship
sufficient to raise a presumption of unfairness as to a conveyance is set forth in the case of Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah
2d 378, 410 P. 2d 17 (1965).

The evidence is abundant to show

that plaintiff reposed great confidence in Millie.on March 3,

1978, and was in a position of inequality due to the mental and
physical factors at that time;· and that on the aforementioned
date, Millie was clearly in a position of superiority.

Also,

the confidence reposed in Millie carried with it an express
legal duty and an abiding moral duty in general and specifically
with respect to plaintiff's.home.
Defendant claims that the deed represents a gift by plaintiff of the home in Nephi to Millie ana the deed from Millie to her
is also a gift.

Applying the law of Johnson v. Johnson, supra,

to the case at bar, a presumption of the unfairness of the said
gift arises which in and of itself will support a finding of duress
and/or undue influence unless the presumption is overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was fair.
At the time of making the alleged gift on March 3, 1978, it
represented her greatest asset and the place to which she was going
to return when and if she was discharged from the hospital; if she
lived in. the home she would have adequate funds, social security
and veterans administration, with which to maintain herself; she
had six children and had expressed the desire to leave her "belongings" to these children in the 1965 will and the February 23, 1978
Power of Attorney; there was nothing in the records to impell
plaintiff
to make a gift to Millie to the exclusion of the other
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children and indeed to the exclusion of herself as duly noted
by the Court in a previous finding of fact.

Thus,

the Court's findings with reference to duress and/or

undue influence and the fiduciary relationship of Millie to plaintiff and in fact to the other heirs are supported by clear and
convincing evidence or the unrebutted presumption of unfairness.
D.

Gift or Trust

Defendant's testimony as to the gift made by plaintiff to
Millie and then from Millie to defendant was clear and unequivocal.
Q
Now, was this, the signing of the deed by
your mother to you, was there any consideration
for that? By that I mean, was it a gift or was
it some type of bargain that you had struck
between you?
A

My mother wanted me to have the house.

Q
Now, to your knowledge is that the same
reason that Trilba gave the house to Millie?

A

Yes.

* * *
Q
In other words, that deed from Trilba to
your mother, that was a gift?

A

Yes.

Q
That was a gift.
is a gift?

A

This Plaintiff's Exhibit 3

Yes.

* * *
Q

Well when when was that that she told you
that ~he had re~eived it from? When did you first
hear that, that she had received this house from
Trilba as a gift?
A
Shortly after the deed was signed from Trilba
to my mother.

Q
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time that it was signed, that's when you were
told that it was a gift from Trilbe (sic) to
Millie?
A

Yes.

* * *
In other words, a week after June 30th of
1980, your mother Millie called you in Denver
and said, "You have a house," that she had executed a deed and recorded it, is that correct?

Q

a
No.
She called me after the 10th of July.
The deed was not recorded until the 10th of July.
Q

Oh, it was dated then - -

It was dated June 30th, but it was not
A
recorded down here. in the courthouse until the
10th of July. She called me approximately about
a week after that and told me that.

Q

And that this was your house?

A
Yes.
(T. 91, Ln. 6-13; 91, Ln. 18-23; 93, Ln. '17-26;
92, Ln. 30; 93, Ln. 1-12)
The Court below made short work of this claim by defendant
and found that plaintiff did not" . . . intend to make a gift of
the property to Millie Colby . . . "

In making this ruling, the

Court relied heavily on the testimony of Miriam Winn, a daughter
of Millie Colby and a half-sister to defendant, concerning the
intent of plaintiff in making the warranty deed, Exhibit 3.
Winn testified as follows:
A
She -- I knew that it had been turned over,
that it had been turned over to Momma while Grandma
was still in the hospital.
By phone.
I don't
remember whether I called Momma or she called me.
But a number of times we talked about it. The idea
behind the whole thing that Momma could see was that
Grandma kept telling her Bonnie had stolen her money,
she wouldn't have a home to live in, and she wanted
Momma to put it in her name, that she was afraid that
she wouldn't have it when she was ready for it. So
Momma done this.
At that time they tried to straighten it out between the two of them, and cesulted in
a lot
ofQuinney
argument.
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Mrs.

Q
Did you ever have any conversations with
Bonnie concerning this house?
A

Yes, uh-huh.

Q

When did they take place?

A
Well, with Grandma, and we had talked about
what we were going to do. The house originally
was put in Mamma's name to be held for Grandma.
(T. 68, Ln. 20-30; 71, Ln. 19-25)
On November 1, 1979, a hearing was held in Third District
Court wherein Walker Bank & Trust Company, by stipulation between
all of the parties involved, was appointed Conservator of plaintiff's estate.

A conversation took place between Millie and Mrs.

Winn in the hallway before the hearing concerning plaintiff's
Exhibit 8, a quit-claim deed from Millie to First Security Bank
on plaintiff's home:
A
We talked outside before we were waiting
for the-other hearing to be over. And at that
time I said to my mother, "What are we going to
do about the house? What do you want to do about
it?" And Momma said, "As soon as the bank has
this in hand, I will sign it back."

* * *
A
Like I tell you, she was very ill. She was
concerned she wouldn't be able to do anything
with the house and that it would be turned over
to Bonnie without it being turned to Grandma. So
a couple of times she tried to get me to go to
the courthouse with her and have it put in my name.

* * *
A
Yes.
I told her I'd rather not get involved
in it.
I thought it was between her, her brothers
and sisters, and Grandma. And so then I wouldn't
go and have it put in my name.
(T. 67, Ln. 29, 30; 68, Ln. 1-3; 69, Ln. 23-29;
70, Ln. 13-16)
After Millie's death, Mrs. Winn had a conversation with
defendant concerning plaintiff's home:
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on the phone.

I called Sharon to tell her that
rs were coming down and they need-

ed the papers from the bedroom, where they were,
and that they would need them to get the house
straightened around for Grandma.
And she said,
"Okay." About twenty minutes later she called
me back and said she thought she should be the
one to tell me that Momma had turned the house
over to her, and what should she do.
I said,
"Sharon, you should .turn the house back to
Grandma." She said, "No, the house was signed
over to me and I'm keeping it."
(T. 70, Ln. 30; 71, Ln. 1-9)
This conversation was corroborated by defendant:
A
And so I called Mairiam (sic) back and told
her that I wanted to be the one to tell her that
mother had given me the house.
Q

Okay.

A
She told me that she didn't feel like the
house was mother's to be giving away.
(T. 87, Ln. 23-28)
This testimony, taken with all of the other evidence concerning the transfer from plaintiff to Millie, would justify a
finding of an express or implied trust, or at the very least, a·
constructive trust. Hawkins ·v. Perry,

Utah

I

25 3 P • 2d

372 (1935).

The testimony of plaintiff on recross-examination, relied
upon heavily by defendant throughout her brief:
Q
That's right.
And isn't it true that you gave
her the house and that you wanted her to have the
house, but now that she's dead you want it back; is
that right?
A
That's correct;
(T. 33, Ln. 13-16)
is consistent with the idea that Millie held the property for
plaintiff to be returned at some future time.
If the deed from plaintiff to Millie fails for any reason,
the deed from Millie to defendant also fails as there is nothing
to convey. Blankenship v. Christensen, supra.
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E.

Consideration.

Defendant testified as follows concerning the deeds to
plaintiff's home:
Q
Now, it was a gift, as far as you were
concerned, you didn't pay any money for this
house?
A

No, I did not.

Q
What about your morn, Millie, did she pay
any money? Did she ever tell you anything about
that?
A
No, I never heard her mention anything
about it.
(T. 95, Ln. 1-6)
Defendant claimed at the pre-trial hearing that the consideration for both deeds was as·follows:
Mr. Anderson: Yes, there was consideration. We
allege that there was consideration on the part
of Mrs. Colby to Mrs. Jones, and then on the part
of Mrs. Kiefer to Mrs. Colby.

* * *
Mr. Anderson:
She was her daughter, and she was
taking care of her.
It was much the same as the
original consideration. They were taking care of
their mothers, and in consideration of that.
(Pretrial T. 10, Ln. 25-28; 11, Ln. 3-6)
The case of Jordan v. Jordan, Utah, 445 P. 2d 765 (1968)
relied on by defendant, refers to love, affection and ensuing
actions as consideration for the deed in that case.

However,

the grantee in that case had promised to care for the granter
during his declining years which was the actual consideration
rather than love and affection.
There was no evidence adduced at the trial to show any
intent on Millie's part to care for plaintiff in consideration
for the deed.

In fact, at the time of the transfer, Millie was
-2}-
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residing in a rented apartment in Spanish Fork and did not
after the conveyance ever live in plaintiff's home in Nephi.
Love and affection and caring for plaintiff was not even
mentioned in defendant's closing argument.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant's Motion for a new trial is based on Rule 59(a) (3)
of the URCP relating to accident and surprise.
claim in.her brief is that the"
other fiduciary relationship .

(R. 27)

Defendant's

.establishment of a trust or
" was not established as an

issue at the pre-trial conference.

During the pre-trial hearing,

the following occurred:
The Court:

Al right, what are they?

Mr. Ables: The next one is undue influence. Fourth
one is no consideration. And fifthly, that conveyance was made to Millie Colby for her to hold until
eitherTrilba Jones got well; or if she was deceased,
she was supposed to administer it under the will.
Mr. Anderson:
I don't think that was pled. That's
a new one on me.
The Court: Don't you have some problems with the
parol evidence rule on that?
Mr. Ables: Well, of course we have, Mrs. Jones
could go ahead and testify as to that.
The Court: All right, we'll leave it as an issue.
(Pretrial T. 8, Ln. 26-30; 9, 1-9)
Then, from this erroneous premise, defendant argues that
because Miriam Winn was not mentioned at the pre-trial as a potential witness and she testified that Millie was holding plaintiff's
home in order to protect it from Bonnie, that this constitutes
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II

.surprise in the raising of a new issue."
The objection raised by defendant on T. 69, 70

that
No

objection was made to Mrs. Winn as a witness on the basis of
accident or surprise or on any other basis.
The case of Jensen v. Thomas, Utah, 570 P. 2d 695 (1977)
is in point and holds that even assuming accident or surprise,
it must be such that " . . . ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against."
Defendant claims that Clint Colby could have rebutted
Mrs. Winn's testimony.

It is atonishing that Clint Colby, Millie's

husband, defendant's father and Mrs. Winn's step-father, who was
present at the time Exhibit 3 was executed was not called by
defendant as a witness in the

f~rst

place.

Not only did Mr. Colby

not testify, he was not even in Court at the time of the trial.
Defendant testified as to the conversation she had with
Mrs. Winn concerning the purpose of the deed and it could not have
been a surprise to defendant when Mrs. Winn appeared in Court.
Ordinary prudence suggests having Mr. Colby available just in case;
assuming his version of the facts was tbe same as defendant's.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP WAS
PROPERLY RECEIVED.
Defendant has complained that before the evidence of a
fiduciary relationship could be received, it should have been
specifically pleaded in plaintiff's complaint.

The issue was
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raised at the pre-trial hearing and that
amendment of plaintiff's complaint.

is tantamount to an

The purpose of the plead-

ings is to give notice to the opposing party and the notice
was given at the time of the pre-trial hearing.

Plaintiff's

complaint could have been amended at the pre-trial hearing and
could have been amended after the trial to conform to the evidence.

Rule 15,. URCP.
Also, the finding could have been based on the Power of

Attorney, Exhibit 9, which was introduced into evidence by
defendant.

CONCLUSION
The evidence supports the findings of the Court below
in whatever quantum necessary and the judgment of the Court setting
aside the deeds from plaintiff to Millie and from Millie to
defendant should be affirmed; and if necessary, new findings and
conclusions should be made by this Court affirming the result
reached by the Court below.

To reverse the judgment for plaintiff

and enter one in favor of the defendant would be to sustain the
deed from plaintiff to Millie as a gift which, based on this
record and the realities and verities of life, would be incredible
and work a manifest injustice on plaintiff.
DATED this

day of September, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Ables
Suite 14, Intrade Building
1399 South Seventh East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed
two true and correct copies of the
paid, on the

for~going,

postage pre-

day of September, 1982, and further

certify that on the

day of September, 1982, I hand

delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing to
the following:
Robert J. Schumacher
81 East Center Street
P~ 0. Box 1667
Provo, Utah 84603
(Hand delivery to the Court hearing on
the above matter)
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